Introduction
The Bill of Rights enshrined in the South African Constitution 1 forbids unfair discrimination. Section 9(1) reads that everyone is equal before the law and has the right of equal protection and benefit of the law. Subsection (2) reads that equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms and that the promotion of equality may be achieved by legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. In terms of subsections (3) and (4) the state or a person may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone inter alia on the ground of marital status.
The notion of equality does not only include equality in the formal sense of the word, but also substantive equality. 2 Legal categories or differentiation for purposes of the law between such categories, are therefore not precluded. In fact the principle to be applied was encapsulated in the Aristotelian concept of distributive justice. Aristotle (384-322 BC) defined the principle of justice that ought to regulate the political distribution of honours, material goods and other similar objects as follows: Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook at 233. The authors point out that a purely formal understanding of equality risks neglecting the deepest commitments of the Constitution. S 9 must therefore be read as grounded on a substantive conception of equality. The Constitutional Court explained it as follows in President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) in par 41: "We … need to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises that although a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each case, therefore, will require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine whether its overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of equality or not. A classification which is unfair in one context may not necessarily be unfair in a different context."
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There will be the same equality between the persons and the shares (to be distributed): the ratio between the shares will be the same as that between the persons. If the persons are not equal, their (just) shares will not be equal; but this is the source of quarrels and recriminations, when equals have and are awarded unequal shares or unequal equal shares.
3 This contribution will focus on the notion of equality as expounded above in respect of matrimonial property regimes against the background of a recent decision by the Constitutional Court in Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 4 (hereafter RAF). In its decision the court pronounced on the constitutional validity of claims for damages of parties against one another where they are married in community of property compared to where they are married out of community of property.
A brief overview over the matrimonial dispensations in South Africa
In essence there are two matrimonial dispensations in South Africa -marriages in and marriages out of community of property. They differ substantially from one another.
Marriage in community of property
In the absence of an antenuptial contract providing otherwise, marriage ex lege creates community of property and of profit and loss -communio bonorum. that co-ownership of the joint estate is a species of bounded co-ownershipthe half share is not only undivided; it is also indivisible.
11
The general rule is that all the assets that the spouses had before the marriage as well as assets they accumulate after entering into the marriage fall into the joint estate. At the moment of conclusion of the marriage, the ownership of the assets pass ex lege to the joint estate and the normal rules as to the passing of ownership do not apply. 18 The compensation is not patrimonial in nature, but comprises satisfaction (solatium or troosgeld) for an infringement of the spouse's personality rights, for example for libel, and compensation for pain and suffering for personal injuries that the spouse has sustained.
Marriage out of community of property
The other matrimonial system in South Africa is marriage out of community of property. A marriage will be out of community, inter alia, if the parties, prior to the conclusion of the marriage entered into a valid antenuptial contract whereby community of property is excluded. 19 The main characteristics of marriage out of community entail that no merging of estates takes place so that both spouses retain their own separate estates and that each spouse manages his or her estate independently of the other spouse. After entering into marriage, each spouse retains the assets he or she had prior to the marriage and assets acquired after the conclusion of the marriage fall into the separate estate of the spouse who acquired them. Contrary to marriage in community of property spouses married out of community of property are normal co-owners of property or property jointly acquired. Each party retains full capacity to act with respect to his or her own estate and spouses can contract independently. Other instances are where, after conclusion of the marriage, the parties enter ito s 21 of the Matrimonial Property Act into a valid post-nuptial contract; or where the legal system where the husband is domiciled directs that the marriage will be out of community of property.
7/20 may also contract with each other. Spouses are not responsible for each other's delicts and they may institute delictual claims against each other.
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The decision in Van der Merwe
Facts
The facts of the case were simple. The wife (Applicant) instituted an action against the RAF, an insurer which was a statutory body that was liable to compensate her for bodily injuries caused by the driving of a motor vehicle. The RAF, however, would only be liable if Applicant could institute a lawful claim against the driver of the motor vehicle that caused her injuries. In casu the parties were married in community of property. Applicant sustained injuries when a motor vehicle driven by her husband collided with her. It was common cause between the parties that Applicant's husband had intentionally knocked her over. In fact, he went on to reverse over her while she was lying on the ground. The parties have since divorced.
Applicant sued for damages arising from the bodily injuries she sustained. The RAF raised a special plea to the claim in which it admitted that Applicant was entitled to claim non-patrimonial damages, but denied liability to compensate applicant for any patrimonial damages by reason of the provisions of section 18(a) and (b) read with section 19(a) which in effect prohibited claims for patrimonial damages between spouses married in community of property.
Applicant replied that section 18 unfairly discriminated on the ground of marital status against spouses married in community of property as opposed to spouses married out of community of property.
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Decision
The question before the court did not pertain to development of the common law, but rather the constitutional validity of section 18(b). 20 The Constitutional
Court particularly considered whether the section discriminated unfairly against spouses married in community of property. The RAF contended that even if there was a differentiation based on marital status, it was not unfair, or alternatively, even if it was unfair, it was justifiable because Applicant had adopted the matrimonial regime out of her own choice. In that way, it was argued, she waived her right to claim patrimonial damages arising from the delict of her husband.
21
Even though the concern of the court was not the development of the common law, it nonetheless considered it beneficial to restate section 18(b)'s common law substratum. It confirmed the common law exposition that parties may not sue each other for delictual loss, patrimonial or non-patrimonial and continued that:
The rule in effect ousts legal redress for delictual loss of any kind arising from the wrongdoing of a spouse against another. The amicus (third respondent) argues, and it must be right, that this rule owes its origin to the boundless patriarchy in a setting where the husband wielded marital power over the wife … and was the exclusive administrator of the joint estate. As long as the marriage endured, the state was deemed to be one, indivisible and subject to one command. 22 (Italics added.)
The court stated, however, that this rule of the common law soon fell foul of evolving societal notions of gender equality within marriage and the equal worth of spouses and legislation, of which section 18 is an example, made inroads into the theoretical unity and inviolability of the joint estate. 9/20 injury, and the amount so recovered does not fall into the joint estate but becomes the spouse's separate property in terms of section 18(a).
24
Against this background the court turned to the question whether this piece of legislative reform that authorises legal redress for non-patrimonial loss, but not for patrimonial damages arising from bodily harm, discriminates against spouses married in community of property vis-à-vis spouses married out of community.
25 It addressed mainly two issues to come to a conclusion namely the difference between patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages and the constitutional prohibition against unfair discrimination.
As far as damages are concerned the court affirmed the general point of departure that patrimonial damages (special damages) are said to be the true equivalent of a person's loss. They are ordinarily calculable in money. In the second place the question whether section 18(b) differentiates between spouses married in and out of community of property, the court has no hesitation to find that it does differentiate. The court held that the distinction created by section 18(b) is in essence between the different proprietary consequences of marriage in and out of community -the law denies one class of married people a protection or a right the other class enjoys. It must be distinguished from the situation where the law withholds from unmarried people a protection or a right which it grants to married people. 28 When the law therefore elects to make a differentiation between people or classes of people it will fall foul of the constitutional standard of equality if it is shown that the differentiation does not have a legitimate purpose or a rational relationship to the purpose advanced to validate it. Absent the pre-condition of a rational connection to the purpose advanced to validate a law, it will prima facie constitute unfair differentiation and infringe the right to equal protection. 29 In this sense, the court held, the impugned law would be inconsistent with the equality norm that the Constitution imposes, in as much as it breaches the rational differentiation standard set by the equality clause in the Constitution.
By refusing the physically brutalised spouse a claim for patrimonial loss, section 18(b) seeks to retain the notional purity of the community of property and to escape the futility of damages that would come from and return to the joint patrimony. 30 However, the government purpose for preserving the unity of the joint estate to avoid the futility of spousal claims for bodily injury has fallen away 
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… there is no rational account why the scheme or purpose of the Act stops short of granting redress in the form of patrimonial damages resulting from spousal violence. The claim would not be futile because the proceeds of the claim would not accrue to the common patrimony but become separate property of the battered spouse. In that event, clearly the guilty spouses will not benefit from their willful or negligent misdeeds.
32
Equally absurd is to withhold from spouses in joint estates patrimonial redress against physical abuse but to grant it to spouses married out of community of property.
33 (Italics added.)
The court then applied its exposition of section 18(b) to the nature of damages.
It found that there was no rational divide between patrimonial and nonpatrimonial damages under these circumstances and that the law of damages recognised both special and general damages to afford the fullest possible redress for delictual harm. By prohibiting recovery of patrimonial damages for personal injury, section 18(b) arbitrarily prevents the fullest possible compensation for spouses who are victims of violence or other wrongdoing that leads to bodily harm by their marriage partners. 34 A further indication of the arbitrariness is that whilst there are definitional differences between patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages, the distinction is often blurred in the case of bodily injury claims since the infringed personality interest often causes loss that affects both the person and the patrimony.
35
The court rejected the argument of the RAF that the limitation of Applicant's right to equal protection and benefit of the law was reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
The argument of the RAF in essence was that marriage was a matter of choice 32 Par 54. 33 Par 55. 34 Par 56. The court indicated in par 57 a further point of arbitrariness in that whilst there are definitional differences between patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages the distinction is often blurred in bodily injury claims because the infringed bodily interest often causes loss that affects both the person and the patrimony. Infringement of bodily integrity is therefore not a reliable predictor of the nature or class of damages that may flow. The absence of a reliable distinction between patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages in bodily injury suits therefore in itself demonstrates that the distinction made in s 18(b) is at best tenuous and it consequently falls foul of the requirement of a rational differentiation. 35 Par 57.
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and so too were the proprietary consequences of marriage -Applicant chose marriage in community of property and it was only fair and reasonable that she be kept to the immutable consequences of her choice. The court found that this argument resolved itself into a waiver defence; it implies an undertaking by married people not to attack the legal validity of the laws that regulate their marriage. 36 This defence is not good in law as the constitutional validity of legislation does not derive from the personal preference of a person affected by a law, but rather the objective validity of a law stems from the Constitution itself.
The constitutional obligation of a court to test the objective consistency of a law against the Constitution does not depend on, and cannot be frustrated by the conduct of litigants or holders of the specific rights. 
Evaluation
Despite the decision in Van der Merwe satisfying one's immediate sense of justice, it drastically deviates from the common law and legislative prescripts.
The court clearly applied its extensive powers under sections 172 read with section 8(1) of the Constitution. 38 Section 172(1)(a) provides that when deciding a constitutional matter a court must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency. It may make any order that is just and equitable in terms of subsection (b) which may include an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity and an order suspending the invalidity for any period and on any condition to allow the competent authority to remedy the defect. In terms of section 8(1) the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the 36 Par 59. 37 Par 61. 38 The court found that s 18(b) is inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid. It ordered that the words "other than damages for patrimonial loss" be severed. This is a direct application of the Constitution. The court did not avail itself of the process commonly known as 'reading down'. S 8(2) provides that a court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when it interprets legislation or develops the common law. Before a court will resort to invalidation of legislation (direct application), it must first consider indirectly applying the Bill of Rights to the statutory provision by interpreting it in such a way as to conform to the Bill of Rights (indirect application). With reference to the common law the principle requires the court to develop it in conformity with the Bill of Rights (indirect application) in preference to assessing whether the common law is in conflict with the Bill of Rights (direct application 13/20 legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. In casu the court directly applied the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the dispute 39 and justified its conclusion that section 18(b) discriminated unfairly against spouses married in community on the basis that the distinction between patrimonial and nonpatrimonial damages is arbitrary. In Badenhorst v Bekker 42 the joint estate of the spouses was sequestrated in 1985. In 1992 the wife inherited assets from her father which assets were specifically excluded from the joint estate in her father's will. The trustees of the joint insolvent estate, however, laid claim to these assets whereupon the wife approached the court for a declaratory order that the excluded assets formed part of her separate estate and could therefore not be utilised as part of the 14/20 insolvent estate. The court took the view that the inheritance could indeed be used to pay the creditors of the joint estate.
It needs no elaboration that
The court decided the question on three arguments. In the first place, the court held, it is trite that a testator may not stipulate in his or her will that an inheritance may not be attached or in the event of the sequestration of an estate, that it will not form part of the insolvent estate. 43 In the second place the court referred to the provisions of the Insolvency Act and came to the conclusion that the act did not contain any provision specifically pertaining to the situation where one of the spouses inherits assets after the joint estate has been sequestrated. An interpretation of the provisions of the Insolvency Act made it clear that the exclusion of the wife's assets in the will of her father was not covered in any of the provisions of the act, which meant that the assets formed part of the joint estate. In the third place the court considered the position at common law and reiterated the position as described in the text accompanying note 5 supra. It concluded that husband and wife are actually co-debtors so that the excluded assets also fell into the joint (insolvent)
estate. 44 The approach of the court was elaborated upon by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Du Plessis v Pienaar 45 where it was held that:
Once it is accepted that debts are incurred by persons, rather than by their estates, and that when the marriage is in community of property both spouses are generally liable for the payment of the debts that are incurred by one of them, it follows that a creditor may look to the estates of both the debtors for recovery of the debt. In the case of a spouse … that estate comprises not only her individual interest in the joint estate but also her separate property that falls outside the joint estate. … The fact that some of her property is separately owned is relevant to the manner in which the property may be dealt with by the spouses inter se and to their rights upon dissolution 
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From the exposition set out above it is clear that insolvency of the joint estate of spouses married in community of property does not only differ from marriages out of community of property, but also creates serious negative consequences for spouses married in community of property vis-à-vis spouses married out of community of property. However, this is also a factor seriously contemplated by creditors in commercial intercourse with spouses as the very fact that spouses are married in or out of community of property may directly influence the issue of the security that they may offer. A particularly serious question raised by the decision in Van der Merwe is whether courts will tamper with this security on the basis that marriage in community of property also in this respect is to the detriment of spouses so married. The unbridled approach of the court certainly suggests that creditors may not hold as strong security as they might wish where debtors are married in community of property. It goes without saying that this result may not only impact negatively on commercial intercourse, but may also give rise to uncertainty.
Flowing from the argument above, and accepting that a spouse's argument under these circumstances prevails, it appears that a further problematic situation presents itself -would it be possible for a spouse to be an insolvent for purposes of the joint estate and a solvent for purposes of his or her separate estate? In Du Plessis the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the line of reasoning in Badenhorst, but also went on to make it clear that the spouses acquire the status of insolvents. 47 It is clear that situations not contemplated by the Constitutional Court will definitely be raised on the basis of Van der Merwe and one may be justified to think that the distinction between marriages in and out community of property may become less visible in the near future.
47 The court explains the position as follows: "The insolvent debtors are both the appellant and her husband, for when spouses are married to one another in community of property debts incurred by one spouse generally accrue to them both. ... Similarly, the remedies provided by the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 are available against both spouses for recovery of the debt that is owed by both of them. ... When the estate is equestrated for recovery of the joint debts of the spouses, both spouses become 'insolvent debtors' for purposes of the Insolvency Act, with the consequence that the property of both of them (comprising their undivided interests in the joint estate as well as separately owned property) is available to meet the claims of creditors." 16/20
Lastly, it appears that the court may have misdirected itself when it took as its point of departure that the true reason underlying the rule that parties may not sue each other is to be found in "the boundless patriarchy in a setting where the husband wielded marital power over the wife." 48 This exposition can not be accepted. The court, it is suggested, failed to distinguish between the administration of the joint estate (marital power) and the nature of joint ownership. The real issue before the court related to the question whether a claim for damages is tenable given the unity of the estate. The administration of the estate was not at issue. Against this background, the court's reference to the husband's marital power, and evolving societal notions of gender equality within marriage and also of the equal worth of spouses may lead to a conclusion that the court reasoned along a line of argument that was not applicable in the circumstances. The common law supplements the provisions of the written Constitution but derives its force from it. It must be developed to fulfil the purposes of the Constitution and the legal order that it proclaims -thus, the command that law be developed and interpreted by the courts to promote the 'spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights'. This ensures that the common law will evolve within the framework of the Constitution consistently with the basic norms of the legal order that it establishes. There is, however, only one system of law and within that system the Constitution is the supreme law with which all other law must comply. 
